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Capacity and Product Market Competition: Measuring Market Power in a
'Puppy-Dog' Industry*
In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which accounts for competition
in two variables: capacity and prices. The model has a two-stage setup. In the first stage
firms make capacity decisions followed by a product-differentiated, price setting game in
the second stage. Since costs are endogenized through the first stage, this has important
implications for the measurement of market power in the product market. In particular,
simpler one-stage specifications would result in a bias in the measurement of market
power, which can be linked to the taxonomy for two-stage games given in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1984). We then estimate this model - demand, cost (short and long run), and
conduct - for the European Airline Industry using data for the period of 1976-1990. We
perform a number of specification tests and reject a simple one-stage specification in
favor of our two-stage set-up. In particular, we find that some degree of market power in
the product market exists.  However, market power in the two-stage set-up is signifi-
cantly lower than in the more widely employed one-stage specification, which is
consistent with the direction of bias in puppy-dog games. This illustrates that firms
market power in the product market is significantly overestimated whenever capacity
competition is not accounted for.
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Kapazitäts- und Produktmarktwettbewerb: Die Messung von Marktmacht in einer
"Puppy-Dog"-Industrie
In diesem Beitrag wird ein strukturelles Modell entwickelt und ökonometrisch geschätzt,
das zwei Variablen des Wettbewerbs berücksichtigt: Kapazität und Preise. Das Modell
ist zweistufig. Auf der ersten Stufe entscheiden die Unternehmen über die Kapazität,
gefolgt von einem Produktdifferenzierungs- und Preissetzungsspiel auf der zweiten
Stufe. Die Endogenisierung der Kosten auf der ersten Stufe hat wichtige Implikationen
für die Messung der Marktmacht im Produktmarkt. Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, daß
eine einfachere einstufige Spezifikation zu einem Meßfehler der Marktmacht führen
würde, was im Hinblick auf die Taxonomie der zweistufigen Spiele von Fudenberg und
Tirole (1984) deutlich wird. Sodann wird das Modell anhand von Daten geschätzt, die
die Nachfrage, kurz- und langfristige Kosten und Marktverhalten der europäischen
Luftfahrtindustrie für die Zeit von 1976 bis 1990 beschreiben. Eine Reihe von Spezifi-
kationstests wird durchgeführt, die zur Ablehnung der einfachen einstufigen Spezifika-
tion zugunsten der zweistufigen Spezifikation führt. Bemerkenswert ist, daß sich empi-
risch zeigt, daß das Spiel in Übereinstimmung mit einer "puppy-dog"-Strategie steht. Mit
anderen Worten europäische Luftfahrtgesellschaften überinvestieren in Kapazitäten, um
weniger aggressiv auftreten zu müssen. Darüber hinaus zeigt sich, daß ein gewisser Grad
an Marktmacht im Produktmarkt existiert. Jedoch ist die Marktmacht in dem zweistufi-
gen Spiel signifikant geringer als in der üblicherweise angewendeten einstufigen Spezifi-
kation. Dies wiederum ist in Übereinstimmung mit dem Bias von "Puppy-dog"-Spielen
und illustriert, daß die Marktmacht von Unternehmen auf Produktmärkten beträchtlich
überschätzt wird, wann immer Kapazitätswettbewerb nicht berücksichtigt wird.1. Introduction
In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which accounts for
competition in two variables:  capacity and prices.  Traditional models of market
power (for a survey see Bresnahan 1989) assume that the degree of market power can
accurately be assessed from models where either price or quantity competition are the
only endogenous variables.  One of the conclusions of this literature is that significant
market power, in the sense of price costs margins, exists in some concentrated
industries.
Recently, more emphasize has been placed on the interactions between product
market competition and other "input" markets, such as R&D, advertisement, finance,
labor, and capacity.  By endogenizing such input markets, which is often done by
using a two-stage set-up, a number of fundamental issues need to be reconsidered.  Of
particular interest is the effect of imperfect product market competition on the demand
for inputs.  Another issue is that of endogenous costs and market structure (Sutton,
1991).  A third area is anti-trust, where conventional wisdom of competition policy
may not hold, once another strategic variable is introduced1.
The purpose of this paper, which is less ambitious, is to investigate whether the
inferred significant degree of market power at the product market level is sensitive to
the introduction of an input variable, namely capacity.  In other words, does
endogenous capacity effect the conclusions about product market competition.  If so,
one needs to reassess the above conclusion that  "there is a great deal of market power,
in the sense of price cost margins, in some concentrated industries" (Bresnahan 1989,
p. 1052) in light of properly endogenized input markets.
To account for competition in input as well as output markets, this paper analysis a
two-stage setup.  In the first stage firms make capacity decisions followed by a
product-differentiated, price setting game in the second stage.  Since costs are
endogenized through the first stage, this has important implications for the
measurement of market power in the product market.  We apply this model to the
European airline industry using data for the period of 1976-1990.
The European airline industry is a particularly good "industry case" where this
argument can be tested.  Firstly, there likely exists significant market power due to the
                                                       
1  An example of this is the paper by Fershtman and Gandal (1994).2
regulatory aspects of the industry.  The reason for this cooperative duopoly structure
in most markets created by bilateral agreements between member states.  In fact, the
rationale for the "liberalization" program in the European airline industry is based on
the presumption to end monopolies and bring prices down to "more competitive"
level.  A first and second package of measures introducing new competition rules,
relaxing price controls, and opening market access where introduced in 1987 and 1989
respectively.  Over time the pressure resulted in a third package, leading towards an
'in principle' open intra-European market by April 1st 1997.  Many of the measures
contained in these packages will take time to implement.  In addition, the question of
third country access, i.e. opening up markets for competitors from non-EC countries
and vice-versa, is still to be addressed more completely and remains in the public
debate. The road to deregulation is still uncertain, but it is rather clear that the
potential for significant market power in the European airline industry existed.  The
purpose of this paper is to assess this claim by measuring market power prior to major
deregulation.
The second reason for why the European airline industry is well-suited for this study
is that capacity investments, such as in planes, are an important aspect of competition.
It is argued that the airline industry is one in which capacity investments (say in
airplanes) are substantial.  In particular, the two-stage set-up of our model assumes
that capacity (airplanes) are long-run decisions, whereas prices are short-run
decisions.  Within the context of the airline industry this is not unreasonable, since
planes must be ordered in advance and delivery times may be lengthy.
The literature on measuring oligopolistic conduct include mostly formulations that
allow for only one strategic variable, such as price or quantity (an incomplete list
includes Iwata (1974), Gallop and Roberts (1979), Appelbaum (1982); for a survey see
Bresnahan (1989)).  Specifically in the U.S. airline industry, market power has been
studied by Brander and Zhang (1990)2.  They conclude that the Cournot model is
much more consistent with the data in general than either Bertrand or cartel behavior.
More recently, market power through repeated interactions has been empirically
tested for.  Brander and Zhang (1993) estimate a switching regime model for the U.S.
                                                       
2 Other important contributions on pricing in the airline industry include Borenstein and Rose (1994)
who analyze price dispersion on a given flight.  The effect of networks on competition and pricing
are sudied in Brueckner, and Spiller (1991), and empirically tested in Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller
(1992).  Evans and Kessides (1994) investigate the ability to exercise market power in the airline
industry through multimarket contact.  They find that fares are higher on routes where the
competing carriers have interroute contact.3
airline industry based on the theory of repeated games.  Firms are assumed to be
implementing punishment strategies to enforce collusion in an uncertain environment
(à la Green and Porter (1984)).  Empirical observations would then be drawn from
either a collusive or punishment phase.  Brander and Zhang reject the constant
behavior models in favor of regime-switching models, where the punishment phases
are best described by Cournot competition3.
A related strand of literature suggests that market power is quite significant in the
U.S. airline industry.  Hurdle et al. (1989) and Whinston and Collins (1992) study the
hypothesis of contestability of the U.S. airline industry.   Overall they find that the
airline market is not contestable and that excess profits are being earned.  In addition,
Berry (1990, 1992) and Borenstein (1989, 1990) argue that airlines are able to increase
average prices through strong airport presence and hub dominance.
Our paper differs from the above literature by explicitly estimating a structural model
which accounts for competition in two variables:  capacity and prices.  The model has
a two-stage setup.  In the first stage firms make capacity decisions followed by a
product-differentiated, price setting game in the second stage4.  Since costs are
endogenized through the first stage, this has important implications for the
measurement of market power in the product market.  We then estimate this model -
demand, cost (short and long run), and conduct - for the European Airline Industry
using data for the period of 1976-1990.  We perform a number of specification tests
and reject a simple one-stage specification in favor of our two-stage set-up.  Regarding
the measurement of market power in the product market, we find that some degree of
market power exists.  However, market power in the two-stage set-up is significantly
lower than in the more widely employed one-stage specification, which is consistent
with the direction of bias in fat-cat games. This illustrates that a firm's market power
in the product market is significantly overestimated whenever capacity competition is
not accounted for.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the model.  Section 3 presents
the empirical analysis, where the functional specifications are given in Sections 3.1,
                                                       
3  Note that, by contrast, our paper focuses on the European airline industry, which is likely to
display more collusive behavior over the sample period studied.
4  Contrary to several other studies (for instance Borenstein and (1994) and Evans and Kessides
(1994)), our model is an aggregate model at the carrier level.  We therefore do not consider specific
route effects or price discrimination strategies.4
consistency checks are described in Section 3.2, and interpretation is given in Section
3.3.  Section 4 concludes.  The data are described in Appendix-A.
2. A Model of Competition for the European Airline Industry
In this section we specify a simple two-stage game where firms make capacity
decisions in the first stage, followed by a product-differentiated market game in prices.
We therefore endogenize capacity decisions, which impacts on the marginal costs in
the second stage and its inferred product market competition.  We begin by specifying
a product-differentiated, price-setting game, where each carrier faces a demand of the
form5,
q p p Z i i j i ( , , ),   i N =1,.., (1)
where N is the number of carriers (or countries), qi is the quantity demanded, pi is a
price index for carrier i, and p j is a price index of the competitors prices.  Zi is a vector
of country-specific, exogenous factors affecting demand6.  The implicit duopoly
assumption in (1) can be justified by the existence of bilateral agreements.  While the
European carriers were engaged in moderate competition in Trans-Atlantic travel, the
domestic scheduled market remained heavily regulated through bilateral agreements
until the mid-eighties.  The resulting duopolistic market structures created by the
bilateral agreements also prevented new entry in the intra-European market.
The price elasticity implicitly defined in (1) is assumed to be negative.  In other words,
a small price elasticity implies that consumers consider carriers to be poor substitutes.















It is through the cost structure that short-run and long-run decisions impact firms'
profitability.  In the short run, firms can affect costs (as well as demand and
profitability) only through changes in prices.  In the long-run carriers can vary their
cost structure through changes in the capital stock (planes).  Therefore, we specify
firm-level long-run costs as follows,
                                                       
5 An alternative demand specification not employed here is the one introduced in Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (1995) which allows for a much richer analysis of product differentiation.
6 We omit the time subscript for notational convenience.5
( ) ( ) C q k r C q k rk
LR
i i i i i i i i i (.), | , (.)| , w w = + (2)
where  ( ) C
LR ￿  denotes the long-run cost function and  ( ) C ￿  the short-run cost function.
Note that short-run costs (or variable costs) depend only on quantity, given a capital
stock (ki) and other fixed factor prices (w).  In the long-run, the quasi-fixed factor
(capital) becomes variable, that is capital can be purchased at its factor prices r.
To endogenize the short- and long-run decisions, we assume that firms behave
strategically:  we specify a two-stage game, where firms purchase capital in stage 1,
followed by price decisions in stage 2.  Thus, in stage 2, each firm solves the following
program,
max (.) ( (.)| , )
pi
i i i i i i q p C q k p w = -
where qi( ) ￿  is given in (1) and C denotes the short-run costs.  Adopting a conjectural-
variation framework, where q ¶ ¶ ” p p j i , the corresponding first-order condition for








































”  is the cross-price elasticity,
and MC(.)”¶ ¶ C qi / .  Assuming that the parameter q  is identified, it can be estimated
and interpreted as the degree of coordination in a price-setting game.  In particular,
when q = 0, behavior is consistent with a Nash game in prices.  In this case (3) reduces
to the well-known relationship where firms price according to their own elasticities.
When q < 0 conduct is more competitive than Nash behavior, with prices approaching
marginal costs as q ﬁ -¥ .  Collusive behavior is consistent with q > 0.  Joint profit
maximization, i.e. cartel pricing, is associated with a q  equal to one.
Let us denote the equilibrium prices defined by (3) as  p k k i i j
*( , ) .  The firms
maximization problem for each firm i in stage 1 can then be written as,
max ( , , ) ( ( , , ), | , )
* * * * *
ki
i i i j i i
LR
i i j i i i i q p p z p C q p p z k r p w = -
                                                       
7 The second-order condition is derived in Appendix-B.6
Omitting the functional arguments as well as the '*' for notational convenience, the

























































 are the respective partial demand derivatives
including the conjectural variations.  Note that under the assumptions on (1) we have
that Di < 0 (since q <1).  Making use of (3) reduces the expression to,














As is well-known (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984), we are left with the direct effect of
period one investment levels on costs, - - ¶ ¶ C k r i i , and the (sequential) strategic effect
arising from the two-period set up, ( ) p MC p k i j j i - D ¶ ¶ .  Whenever the strategic effect is
zero, there is no need to specify a two-stage setup, and only the direct effect of stage
one capacity decisions on (short-run) costs are considered.  In this case (4) reduces to
- = ¶ ¶ C k r i i  and both capacity and pricing decisions are modeled simultaneously9.
Econometrically, the estimation of market power in such models should proceed by
estimating equations (1), (3), and (4) simultaneously.  It is clear that estimation of
equations (1) and (3) alone, which assumes that capacity investment levels are
exogenous, introduces potential simultaneity bias, and leads to less efficient estimates.
Furthermore, estimation of equations (1), (3) and (4) which ignores the strategic two-
stage set-up is subject to a potential misspecification in equation (4), leading towards
inconsistent estimates of market power and other elasticities.  Below we investigate
whether the two-stage set-up is appropriate by testing whether the sequential strategic
effect is statistically significant.
Note that since ( ) p MC i j - > D 0, the sequential strategic effect exists whenever
¶ ¶ p k j i „ 0.  Using the structure of the model we can solve explicitly for ¶ ¶ p k j i .
                                                       
8 See Appendix-B for the second-order conditions.
9  Note that ¶ ¶ C ki < 0, since this is the reduction in short-run costs from one more unit of capacity.7
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where   A
MC
qi
i ” - 2
¶
¶












.  Note that as long as ¶ ¶ MC qi ‡ 0 we that
A>0 and B>0  (this also guarantees that the second-order condition at stage 2 is
satisfied).  In addition, assuming own demand effect is larger than the cross-demand
effect, i.e. - > > D D i j 0, we have that A>B which implies that the cross-sequential
strategic effect (¶ ¶ p k j i / ) is smaller in absolute value than the own-sequential effect
(¶ ¶ p k i i / ).  The fact that the own strategic effect dominates the cross strategic effect is a
direct consequence of the own-demand effect dominating the cross-demand effect.
Finally, note that  { } { } { } sign p k sign p k sign MC k i i i j i ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ / / / = = .
Given the above, we can relate this to the taxonomy for two-stage games given in
Fudenberg and Tirole (19984).  Since the second-stage game is in prices, we have
strategic complements.  Whenever ¶ ¶ MC ki < 0 we have a game where stage one
capacity investment makes firms "tough", since marginal costs are lower.  According
to Fudenberg and Tirole this implies that we have a puppy-dog strategy, which refers to
a situation where firms underinvest in capacity in order to be a less threatening rival.
Conversely, whenever ¶ ¶ MC ki > 0 we have that first stage investment makes the firms
"soft", which is coined a fat-cat strategy, where firms overinvest in order to be less
aggressive.
In sum, we have that ¶ ¶ MC ki , which is the effect of capacity on the marginal costs in
stage two, determines the sign and magnitude of how the two-periods are linked.
This is an important effect in the model, since whenever it is zero there is no need to
specify a two-stage game, since stage one variables have no impact on stage two decisions.  In
this case the (sequential) strategic effect is zero and all choices are simultaneous.  Whether the
sequential setup is relevant to estimate market power can therefore be tested through
the significance of ¶ ¶ MC ki .
Moreover, the sign of ¶ ¶ MC ki  will determine the direction of bias if a two-stage set-up
is not used.  To illustrate this, let ¶ ¶ MC ki < 0, i.e. we have a puppy-dog game.  Suppose
that in this case a certain amount of market power exists which we wish to measure.
Since market power in the product market generally leads to increased capacity8
investment in stage one10, marginal costs as well as prices will decline.  From the
second-order condition of stage 1 (see Appendix-B) we have that ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ p k MC k i i i - > 0.
In other words, marginal costs decline by more than prices when capacity investment
increases, which increases the price-cost margin.  This implies that in the context of (3)
larger price-cost margin are associated with the same degree of market power q .
Consequently, ignoring such feedbacks to the capacity stage, an upward bias in the
measurement of market power occurs.
The direction of bias is reversed whenever the capacity game is a fat-cat strategy.  To
see this let ¶ ¶ MC ki > 0, which implies that capacity increases marginal costs in stage
two.  From the second-order condition of stage 1 (see Appendix-B) we now have that
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ p k MC k i i i - < 0, that is marginal costs increase by more than prices when capacity
investment increases.  This implies that smaller price-cost margin are associated with
the same degree of market power q .  The following remark summarizes these
arguments.
Remark: Whenever the capacity game can be categorized as a puppy-dog (i.e.
¶ ¶ MC ki < 0) then a one-stage game would result in an upward bias in the
measurement of market power.  Whenever the capacity game can be
categorized as a fat-cat (i.e. ¶ ¶ MC ki > 0) then a one-stage game would result
in an downward bias in the measurement of market power.  Finally,
whenever ¶ ¶ MC ki = 0 then no bias exists.
The sign and significance of ¶ ¶ MC ki /  will be a testable hypothesis in the empirical
section below.
3.  Empirical Implementation
3.1 Functional Specification, Data and Estimation
The implementation of the above model involves the simultaneous estimation of the
demand equation (1) and the first-order conditions (3) and (4) subject to (5)11.  The
endogenous variables are therefore prices, quantities, and capital (number of planes).
The demand equation corresponding to (1) is specified as follows,
                                                       
10  This effect is a variant of what is known as semi-collusion (see Fershtman and Gandal, 1994) and
does not hold for all functional specifications.
11 The cost equation (2) could also be estimated.  However, this increases the number of parameters to
be estimated substantially, depending on the specific functional form used.  On the other hand,
estimation of the cost function would allow a more complete analysis of  productive efficiency.9
q p p p GDP GASOLINE GDP
GCONS RAIL NETWORK
i i j j i i i
i i i i
= + + + + +
+ + + +
a a a a a a
a a a e
0 1 2 22 3 4
5 6 7 1
(1a)
where e  denotes the error term.  The exogenous variables influencing demand are: an
index of the price of all other airlines (Pj), an index of the price of gasoline
(GASOLINE), an index for the price of rail transportation (RAIL), a measure of
country size (GDP), a measure of economic activity - consumption growth (GCONS),
and a measure of the size of the carriers' network (NETWORK).  The data and their
construction are described in more detail in Appendix-A.  Summary statistics of the
data are given in Table 1.
To complete the parameterization we must specify two more derivatives of the short-
run cost function (2).  First, the short-run marginal cost equation (¶ ¶ C qi / ) implicitly
defined in (2) is assumed to be linear in capital, two factor prices: the price of labor and
materials, as well as two cost characteristics: the load factor (LOADF) and the stage
length (STAGEL)12.  That is,
¶
¶
b b b b b b
C
q
MC k PL PM LOADF STAGEL
i
i i i i i = = + + + + + 0 1 2 3 4 5
Second, the effect of adding capacity to short-run marginal cost (¶ ¶ C ki / ) is assumed to
be linear in output and two characteristics of capital: the percentage of wide-bodied
planes in the fleet (PWIDE), and the percentage of turboprop planes (PTURBO)13,
¶
¶





i i i = + + + 0 1 2 3 , (2a)
which must be negative.  Applying Roy’s identity we constrain the parameter on ki  in
the short-run marginal cost equation to be equal to the parameter on output in the
long-run marginal cost equation, i.e. g b 1 1 = .  Using the above functional specifications,
we can substitute  ( ) Di i GDP = + ￿ + a q a a 1 2 22  and MC into (3) yielding,
( )
p k PL PM LOADF STAGEL
q
GDP
i i i i i i
i
i
i = + + + + + -
+ ￿ +
+ b b b b b b
a q a a
e 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 22
2 (3a)
                                                       
12  Load factor is used here, just as it is used in most empirical studies of transportation, to proxy
service quality and thus is interpreted as a characteristic of service output.
13  The average fleet configuration variables (percentage wide-bodied and percentage of turboprop)
are interpreted as heterogeneity controls for the planes in each carrier’s fleet.10
where e2i is the error term.  For the first-order condition for capacity investments in
stage one (4) we can substitute (2a) and (5) into (4), noting that under the above
functional specifications  A = 2  and  B j i = -D D , yielding,
( )
( )
p MC q PWIDE PTURBO r i j
j i
j i
i i i -
-
- - - - - + = D
D D
D D
b g b g g e 1 2 0 1 2 3 3
4
0 (4a)
where MC and Di  are as above and D j i GDP = + a a 2 22 .  Using these functional forms we
estimate the system of three equations (1a), (3a), and (4a), which endogenize prices,
output, and capacity,  by nonlinear three stage least squares.  The results are reported
in Table 2.
3.2 Consistency Checks
Before interpreting the results, we perform several consistency checks on whether the
theoretical model is in line with the empirical estimates.  These tests can be thought of
as specification tests of having chosen the "right" structure for the data in hand.  Given
that we have imposed a considerable amount of structure, there are a number of
conditions which need to be satisfied but have not been imposed ex ante.  The purpose
of this subsection is to investigate whether the "data reject the model".
As can be seen in Table 2, the demand estimates are in line with our maintained
assumptions.  Both the own-price elasticity (-1.284) and cross-price elasticity (0.289 at
sample mean) have the expected signs.  In addition, our maintained assumption that
the own-price effect is larger in absolute value than the cross-price effect, is confirmed
by the data at each sample point14.  Since our theoretical model of product
differentiation assumes that firms are monopolists in their respective niches, it follows
that firms must price in the elastic part of their linear demand schedules (see also
Panzar and Rosse (1987)).  We therefore must have a point elasticity of demand above
unity.  Our estimate in Table 2 for the own-price elasticity of demand is -1.284, and
therefore is consistent with the theory.
In addition, the estimates in Table 2 imply at all sample points that the partial own-
demand effect is negative (D i < 0), which is sufficient for the second-order condition at
stage 2 to be satisfied (see Appendix-B).  Furthermore, the partial own demand effect
(at all sample points) is larger in absolute value than the cross-demand effect, i.e.
                                                       
14  For example at the sample mean ,we have - = > = ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ q p q p i i i j 209478 477 36 . . .11
- > > D D i j 0.  As mentioned in the previous section, this implies that the cross-
sequential strategic effect (¶ ¶ p k j i / ) is smaller in absolute value than the own-
sequential effect (¶ ¶ p k i i / ) and that they have the same sign.
Finally, there are some requirements for the stage one maximization problem to be
well-defined.  A restriction that must be met is that the effect of capacity on short-run
marginal costs is negative, i.e. ¶ ¶ C ki < 0, which ensures that the first-order condition
(4) can be satisfied15.  In other words, adding capacity must lower marginal costs in
order for firms to have any incentive to invest in capacity.  Given the estimates in
Table 2, we find that ¶ ¶ C ki < 0 at all sample points.  Furthermore, the second-order
condition for capital is also satisfied at all sample points16, since ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ p k MC k i i i - > 0
(see Appendix-B).
In sum, the estimates in Table 2 are consistent with all the restrictions and maintained
assumptions of theoretical model developed above.
3.3 Interpretation of Parameters
We now interpret the results given in Table 2 in more detail.  The price elasticity of
demand is estimated at -1.284 which indicates an elasticity close to unity (in fact the
estimate is statistically not significantly different from one).  As mentioned above,
since a monopolist prices in the elastic part of a linear demand function, the above
finding is consistent with airlines exercising some degree of market power in their
respective market niches.  The cross-price elasticity depends on GDP and is estimated
at 0.289 (at the sample mean) which indicates that airlines are substitutes.
Many of the remaining parameters have the expected signs.  For the demand equation
GDP, the price of railroad transportation, and the size of the network all have positive
and significant effects.  The price of gasoline has a negative effect on airline demand,
indicating that automobiles and air travel are complements.  This might be explained
by the fact that gasoline prices are highly correlated with fuel prices.  Consumption
growth has a negative but insignificant effect on demand for air travel.  The cost
parameters generally have the expected signs.  For the marginal cost function capital
has the expected negative effect (we will return to this below), the load factor raises
                                                       










16 Evaluating at sample mean, the second-order condition is -9.292E-7.12
marginal costs, whereas the stage length lowers marginal costs.  Unexpectedly, the
price of labor has a negative effect on marginal costs, indicating a high degree of factor
substitution.  Turning to the marginal cost of capital specification, we get the expected
impact.  An increase in wide-bodied planes lowers marginal costs, and more
turboprop planes raises marginal costs.
As mentioned earlier, the effect of capital on marginal costs, ¶ ¶ MC ki , determines
whether the two-stage model can be reduced to a one-stage model.  Since this effect is
negative and significant (t-stat of -1.91), we reject a one-stage model in favor of the
two-stage specification.  In particular, since ¶ ¶ MC ki < 0, we find that empirically the
game is consistent with a puppy-dog strategy.  Moreover, using a one-stage model
without capacity competition, would lead to biased estimates of market power, since it
ignores the strategic linkages between competition in capacity and prices.  Since
empirically we find that ¶ ¶ MC ki < 0, as well as ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ p k MC k i i i - > 0, we would expect
the direction of bias to be upward.  We will return to this point shortly.
Turning to the measurement of market power in this two-stage set-up we find that
there is some evidence to suggest that firms achieve market power through collusion.
The estimated market power index q  is .646.  More importantly, it is significantly
different from zero (Nash behavior) as well as one (Cartel behavior).  Therefore, we
reject the hypothesis of Nash behavior (t-stat of 6.72) as well as Cartel behavior (t-stat
of 3.68).  This suggests that firms do exercise some form of market power, although
there is no evidence of cartel pricing.  Using equation (3) the estimated mark-up over
marginal costs is equal to 91%, which is substantial.  One measure of comparison is to
compute the mark-up for the case of Nash behavior.  Setting q = 0  (or equivalently
hij = 0) in (3) we obtain a mark-up of 78%.  We therefore have a 13% increase in the
mark-up due to non-cooperative pricing in the product market.
As we argued above, ignoring the capacity stage would introduce an upward bias in
the measurement of market power.  In order to quantify this bias in the context of the
empirical investigation at hand, it is interesting to compare the above results on
market power to those which we would have obtained if one where to ignore the
endogeneity of capital investment altogether.  To do this we have re-estimated our
model reducing it to a one-stage, simultaneous move pricing game.  In other words
we re-specify the first-order condition (3a) as,
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where we need to replace ki  in (3a) with the price of capital  PKi in order to have a
well-specified marginal cost function17.  The new model to be estimated thus consists
of equations (1a) and (3b), which is the standard two-equation structural model often
used to measure market power.  The estimated market power from the one-stage set-
up is substantially different:  the market power index q  is now .944, which is
significantly higher than before and rather close to cartel behavior18.  In addition the
direction of bias is as expected.
To illustrate this bias in the estimated market power further, Table 4 summarizes the
comparison between the two alternative models in terms of mark-ups.  As can be seen,
the estimated mark-up over marginal costs for the standard one-stage model is over
100%, which is almost 10% higher than under the two-stage specification.  By contrast
the difference in price-cost margins between the two specifications for non-cooperative
Nash behavior is very small, with only 2.5%.  This implies that while the two-stage
model associates only some 13% of the estimated mark-up with non-cooperative
behavior, a standard one-stage model would attribute almost 20% of the mark-up with
collusion.
In sum, it appears that firms market power is significantly overestimated whenever
capacity competition is not accounted for.
4. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to investigate whether the inferred significant degree of
market power at the product market level is sensitive to the introduction of an input
variable, namely capacity.  In other words, does endogenous capacity effect the
conclusions about product market competition.
To test this assessment we specify and estimate a structural model which accounts for
competition in two variables:  capacity and prices.  We then estimate this model -
demand, cost (short and long run), and conduct - for the European Airline Industry
using data for the period of 1976-1990.  We argue that the European Airline Industry is
particularly well-suited for this purpose.  We perform a number of specification tests
and reject a simple one-stage specification in favor of our two-stage set-up.  Regarding
                                                       
17  Note that there is no difference between the short- and long-run cost function anymore, and
therefore only factor prices appear in the marginal cost specification.
18  Nevertheless, we the model still rejects cartel pricing with a t-stat of 1.92.14
the measurement of market power in the product market, we find that some degree of
market power exists.  However, market power in the two-stage set-up is significantly
lower than in the more widely employed one-stage specification, which is consistent
with the direction of bias in puppy-dog games.  This illustrates that firms market
power in the product market may be significantly overestimated whenever capacity
competition is not accounted for and that the claim that "there is a great deal of market
power, in the sense of price cost margins, in some concentrated industries" (Bresnahan
1989, p. 1052) may partially be due to the fact that input markets have not been
properly endogenized.
There are several implications of the above findings.  Combining these results with
other findings that European carriers have a substantial cost disadvantage vis-à-vis
their U.S. competitors (see Good, Röller, and Sickles (1993)) it seems likely that most of
the benefits from European liberalization will come from the elimination of cost
inefficiencies.  This is especially so in light of the above model where market power is
even smaller, once capacities are endogenized.  Given that prices are not high because
of outright cartel pricing, airline prices in Europe might come down more gradually as
efficiency increases and market niches are abolished.15
Appendix-A
Data Description and Construction
This study uses a panel of the eight largest European carriers - Air France, Alitalia,
British Airways, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, SABENA and SAS with annual data from
1976 through 1990.  The data can be organized into three broad categories: production
and cost data, network data and demand data.
Production and cost data:  The primary source for the production data is the Digest of
Statistics from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Good, Röller, and
Sickles [1993] constructed a set of three airline inputs: Labor, Materials and Aircraft
Fleet. The labor input is an aggregate of five separate categories of employment used
in the production of air travel. Included in these categories are all cockpit crew,
mechanics, ticketing, passenger handlers and other employees. Information on annual
expenditures and the number of employees in each of the above categories were
obtained from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Fleet and Personnel
Series.  These indices are aggregates of a number of sub components using a Divisia
multilateral index number procedure [Caves, Christensen and Diewert, 1982].
Expenditures on supplies, services, ground-based capital equipment, and landing fees
are combined into a single input aggregate called materials. It is not necessarily true
that the purchasing power of a dollar or its market exchange rate equivalent is the
same in all countries. Consequently we use the purchasing power parity exchange
rates constructed from Heston and Summers [1988]. These are adjusted by allowing
for changes in market exchange rates and changes in price levels. Use of airport
runways is constructed by using landing fee expenses and using aircraft departures as
the quantity deflator. The service price for owned ground based equipment is
constructed by using the original purchase price, 7 % depreciation and the carrier's
interest rate on long term debt.  Fuel expenses are given for each carrier in ICAO's
Financial Data Series.  Unfortunately, there are no quantity or price figures given in
that source.  There are two possible solutions.  The first is to estimate fuel
consumption for each aircraft type in the fleet, given the consumption of U.S. carriers
on similar equipment for the specific number of miles flown and adjusting for stage
length.  Alternatively, fuel prices for international traffic in several different regions is
available through ICAO's Regional Differences in Fares and Costs.  The airline's fuel
price is then estimated as a weighted average of the domestic fuel price (weighted by
domestic available ton-kilometers), and regional prices (weighted by international16
available ton-miles in the relevant region).  This method explicitly recognizes that for
international carriers not all fuel is purchased in the airline's home country.  As with
the labor input, these sub components are aggregated using a multilateral index
number procedure and are termed materials.
A very detailed description is available for aircraft fleets. These data include the total
number of aircraft, aircraft size, aircraft age, aircraft speed, and utilization rates. This
information is available over the course of a year from ICAO and a calendar year's end
inventory is available from IATA's World Air Transport Statistics. Asset values for each
of these aircraft types in half-time condition is obtained from Avmark, one of the
world's leading aircraft appraisers. This data source provides a more reasonable
measure of the value of the fleet since it varies with changing market conditions.
Jorgenson-Hall user prices for the fleet are constructed by using straight line
depreciation with a total asset life of 20 years and the relevant long term interest rates.
Data on output (both services available and services provided) is obtained from
ICAO's Commercial Airline Traffic Series. They disaggregate airline output along
physical dimensions (classification into passenger output and cargo (classification into
available output and purchased output), along utilization dimensions, along
functional dimensions (classification into scheduled and non-scheduled output), and
finally on geographic dimensions (classification into domestic and international
output). This leads to 16 sub aggregations of airline output.
The revenues for the carriers are obtained from the - Digest of Statistics (Financial Data -
Commercial Air Carriers) from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Revenues are available for passenger, freight, mail and non-scheduled output.  The
price is calculated as a ratio of the carrier's passenger revenues (including excess
baggage) to passenger ton-kilometer miles performed.
Network and Fleet Specific Data: The primary source for the network data is the World
Air Transport Statistics publication of the International Air Transport Association
(IATA).
Three characteristics of airline output and two characteristics of the capital stock are
calculated. These included load factor, stage length, a measure of network size, the
percent of the fleet which is wide bodied, and the percent of the fleet which uses
turboprop propulsion. Load factor provides a measure of service quality and is used17
as a proxy for service competition. Stage length provides a measure of the length of
individual route segments in the carrier's network. The number of route kilometers
provides a measure of total network size.
Both the percent of the fleet which is wide bodied and the percent using turboprop
propulsion provide measures of the potential productivity of capital. The percent wide
bodied provides a measure of average equipment size. As more wide bodied aircraft
are used, resources for flight crews, passenger and aircraft handlers, landing slots, etc.
do not increase proportionately. The percent turboprops provide a measure of aircraft
speed. This type of aircraft flies at approximately one-third of the speed of jet
equipment. Consequently, providing service in these types of equipment requires
proportionately more flight crew resources than with jets.
Demand Data:  The demand data for the same period was collected for the respective
countries - France, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and the
three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Sweden, Norway.  The different data series
for Denmark, Sweden and Norway are weighted by their respective GDP's in order to
create single representative indices for the Scandinavian countries, which share the
majority of the equity in SAS.
The price of the "other" airlines (Pj) in the duopoly model is computed by weighting
all the individual prices by their respective revenue shares in the market.  Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) was obtained from the Main Economic Indicators publication
of the Economics and Statistics Department of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).  It is reported for the above countries, in
billions of dollars.  The OECD Economic Outlook publication, Historical Statistics is the
source of the growth in private consumption expenditure data. They are reported as
an implicit price index with year to year percentage changes. The annual short-term
interest rates were also obtained from this publication. The rates are reported by the
respective countries on the basis of the following financial instruments: Belgium
(three-month Treasury certificates), Denmark (three-month interbank rate), France
(three-month Pibor), Germany (three-month Fibor), Italy (interbank sight deposits),
Netherlands (three-month Aibor), Norway (three-month Nibor), Spain (three-month
interbank loans), Sweden (three-month Treasury discount notes) and the United
Kingdom (three-month interbank loans).18
Jane's World Railway is the source of the rail data. Rail traffic is reported in four
categories: passenger journeys, passenger tone-kilometers, freight net tone-kilometers
and freight tones. The three revenue categories are passengers and baggage, freight,
parcels and mail, and other income. To be consistent with the price of air travel, the
rail price was calculated as the ratio of passenger (and baggage) revenue to passenger
tone-kilometers.  We thank S. Perelman for making available to us some of the more
recent rail data which were not available in Jane's World Railway.
The retail gasoline prices (prices plus taxes) were obtained from the OECD,




In this appendix we derive the conditions under which the second-order conditions in
stage 1 and 2 hold.  We start with stage 2 by re-writing (3) as,
( ) q p MC i i i + - = D 0
Assuming a linear demand function, the second-order condition can then be written
as,



























Since A=2 for the functional specifications assumed above, the second-order condition
is met whenever Di < 0.
Stage 1:
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Table 1:  Data Statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
PI 1.151 0.740 1.855
QI 1.878 .5164 6.165
KI 90.652 23.500 241.000
PJ 1.137 0.768 1.364
PK 2.814 1.155 7.031
PL 2.454 0.368 4.583
PM 0.970 0.493 1.599
GASP 0.642 0.311 1.233
GDP 406.380 66.600 1488.210
GCONS 7.659 -0.900 23.700
PRAIL 0.048 0.0143 0.136
NETWORK 421.851 188.787 1072.390
PWIDEB 29.622 8.000 84.010
PTURBO 5.236 0 38.430
LOADF 63.805 53.489 72.700
STAGEL 11.478 6.495 19.313
For variable definitions see Appendix-A.  Number of observations is 120.21
Table 2:  EUROPEAN AIRLINES - Two Stage Game
 (NON-LINEAR THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES)























Behavioral Parameters NASH Cartel
q 0.646 6.72 3.68
The estimates reported in the demand equation are converted into elasticities.  Number of observations =
120.22













One-Stage Game 80.6% 100.1% .94 1.24
Two-Stage Game 78.1% 91.3% .65 1.2823
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